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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT PRECLUDE PLAIN 
ERROR REVIEW OF THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPERMISSIBLY 
ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY, WHICH 
UNDERMINED THE JURY'S RESPONSIBILITY TO FIND THE 
ULTIMATE FACTS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND 
SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION TO DEFENDANT. 
In its Brief, the State argues that "[b]ecause Defendant 
affirmatively approved all of the jury instructions, he cannot 
prevail on his claim that the trial court plainly erred in giving 
Instruction 33". See Brief of Appellee, p. 5 (capitalization and 
boldface omitted). Utah Supreme Court case law and the factual 
circumstances surrounding this case demonstrate otherwise. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the invited error doctrine 
does not absolutely bar "plain error" review. In State v. Casey, 
2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106, which the Utah Supreme Court favorably 
cited to in the recent case of Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 
P. 3d 3 66, the Court noted that the invited error doctrine "may 
preclude application of the plain error analysis . . . ." See 
Casey, 2003 UT 55 at f39 n.10 (italicized emphasis added).1 
xThe Utah Supreme Court stated the following in footnote 10 of 
its opinion: 
In a recent case, we held that "if counsel, either by 
statement or act affirmatively represented to the court 
that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction we 
will not review the instruction under the manifest 
injustice exception." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f54, 
70 P.3d 111. This holding is based on the invited error 
doctrine as explained in State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 1201, 1220 
(Utah 1993) . While it would appear that Hamilton may 
1 
Casey, like the instant case, involved a challenge on appeal to 
the jury instructions utilized at trial. Id. at flfl, 9, 82 P. 3d 
1106. Notwithstanding trial counsel's indication, in Casey, that 
"he had no exceptions to the instructions offered by the State" 
and his affirmative response that he would not request any 
additional instructions,2 the Utah Supreme Court refused to apply 
the invited error doctrine as a bar to its review and proceeded to 
examine the contested jury instructions under the plain error 
test. Id. at iJ41, 82 P.3d 1106. 
In addition to Utah Supreme Court case law permitting plain 
error review of the erroneous jury instruction, this case is 
distinguishable by the fact that appointed trial counsel's failure 
to object to Jury Instruction No. 33 is the same af f i rmative 
representation relied upon by the State to invoke the invited 
error doctrine. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 5-6. Consequently, 
the State's argument is in direct contravention to the policy 
underlying the invited error doctrine. 
preclude application of the plain error analysis under Rule 
19 (e), neither party raised this question below or in their 
briefs or at oral argument before us. " [B]ecause the issue 
was neither raised below nor briefed on appeal we will not 
make that determination sua sponte." Evans v. State, 963 
P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). 
State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33, 1(39 n.10, 82 P.3d 1106. 
2Id. at %9, 82 P.3d 1106. 
2 
The invited error doctrine "arises from the principle that a 
party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when 
that party led the trial court into committing the error." State 
v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 1fl5, 128 P.3d 1171. By foreclosing 
appellate review, "the doctrine furthers this principle by 
discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial 
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.'" 
Id., 128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, fl2, 
86 P.3d 742). Hence, parties are "not entitled to both the 
benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on 
appeal." State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ^13, 131 P. 3d 202. 
Mr. Bennett received neither advantage nor benefit from 
appointed trial counsel's failure to object to the jury 
instruction. Rather, the failure to object significantly 
increased the likelihood that he would be convicted, which, in 
fact, occurred. 
The trial court at the close of evidence charged the jury 
with the following instruction concerning Mr. Bennett's possession 
of stolen property: 
Mere possession of recently stolen property, 
if not coupled with other inculpatory or 
incriminating circumstances, is not sufficient to 
support a conviction for burglary. Possession of 
articles recently stolen, however, when coupled 
with circumstances inconsistent with innocence, 
such as hiding or concealing them, or of making a 
3 
false or improbable or unsatisfcictory explanation 
of the possession, may be sufficient to connect 
the possessor with the offense and to justify his 
conviction for burglary. 
In order for the defendant's possession of 
recently stolen property to be sufficient to 
support a conviction of burglary, such possession 
must be recent, that is, not too remote in point 
of time from the crime, personal, exclusive 
(although it may be joint if definite), distinct, 
conscious, and such possession must be coupled 
with a lack of a satisfactory explanation or other 
incriminating circumstances as mentioned 
previously. If these conditions are met, then you 
may consider possession of recently stolen 
property, coupled with other inculpatory or 
incriminating circumstances as evidence of 
burglary. 
(See R. 53, Jury Instruction No. 33). This instruction not only 
undermined the jury's responsibility as the fact finder, it 
shifted the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the Defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 
(Utah 1985) , held that an instruction raising a presumption of 
guilt, and thereby impermissibly shifting the burden to the 
defendant to prove his innocence, is unconstitutional. Id. at 
325-27; see also State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah 1986). 
Similarly, Jury Instruction No. 33 raised an impermissible 
presumption of guilt in the instant case. By the instruction's 
plain language, the jury may presume or consider the possession of 
recently stolen property coupled with an unsatisfactory 
explanation of the possession as "evidence of burglary." 
4 
The appellate court must determine the nature of the 
presumption set forth in the instruction as a threshold matter to 
determine the applicable constitutional analysis. See County 
Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 
2213 (1979). This determination requires careful consideration of 
the words actually spoken to the jury, inasmuch as whether a 
defendant has been accorded his or her constitutional rights 
depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have 
interpreted the instruction. Id. at 157-59, n.16, 99. S.Ct. 2213. 
Due to the lack of qualifying instructions in this case 
concerning the effect of the presumption or inference, the jury 
could have believed that it had no alternative but to apply the 
presumption. Cf. State v. Johnson, 748 P. 2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 
1987) (discussing curative effect of explanatory instruction) . 
Being instructed that "you may consider possession of recently 
stolen property, coupled with other inculpatory or incriminating 
circumstances as evidence of burglary" could reasonably be 
construed as being told that the matter is presumed with there 
being no choice as to the effect. Further, the jury likely 
believed that the quantum of evidence was something less than 
beyond a reasonable doubt due to the total lack of explanation in 
the instruction concerning the applicable standard of proof. 
5 
A reasonable jury could well have interpreted the conditions 
outlined in the instruction as an irrefutable directive by the 
court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the 
presumption. Alternatively, the jury may have interpreted the 
instruction as a directive from the couirt to find intent upon 
proof of the defendant's acts,3 unless the defendant proved the 
contrary by some quantum of proof which may well have been 
considerably greater than some evidence -- thus effectively 
shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. 
There is a distinct possibility that the jury interpreted the 
instruction either of the aforementioned ways due, again, to the 
lack of qualifying instructions concerning the effect of the 
presumption or inference in Jury Instruction No. 33. 
II. APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 33, WHICH RAISED A PRESUMPTION OF 
GUILT AND THEREBY UNDERMINED THE JURY'S 
RESPONSIBILITY AS THE FINDER OF FACT# SHIFTED THE 
BURDEN OF PERSUASION TO THE DEFENDANT, AND FAILED 
TO ESTABLISH THE APPLICABLE QUANTUM OF PROOF. 
In its Brief, the State argues that Mr. Bennett cannot 
prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because 
3By way of Jury Instruction No. 39, the court instructed the jury 
that "[i]ntent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof 
by direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from 
acts, conduct, statement and circumstances." (R. 59, Jury Instruction 
No. 39) (italicized emphasis added). 
6 
the instruction contained no error. See Brief of Appellee, p. 7. 
The error contained in Jury Instruction No. 33 is specifically 
demonstrated by existing United States Supreme Court and Utah case 
law previously discussed in detail in Argument I of both the Brief 
of Appellant and this Reply Brief as well as the underlying 
factual circumstances of this case. 
Consequently, appointed trial counsel's failure to object to 
the court's proposed Jury Instruction No. 33 not only fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment but it 
resulted in substantial prejudice to Mr. Bennett. See Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct 2052, 2064 (1984). But 
for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to research the 
proposed instruction and object to it prior to the court utilizing 
it to charge the jury, the result at trial would have been 
different. By objecting to the instruction, the trial court more 
likely than not would have corrected the instruction so as not to 
undermine the jury's responsibility as the ultimate fact finder 
and shift the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the 
Defendant, and by adequately explaining the applicable quantum of 
evidence. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Mr. Bennet respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction of Burglary and 
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth in its 
opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of December, 2007. 
ARNOLD\& WIGGINS, P.C. 
^ nggjrfis 
rs fof^A^pellant 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
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